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BOOK REVIEWS
Much Ado About Nothingness: Essays on Nishida and Tanabe. By James W. 
Heisig. Nagoya: Chisokudō Publications. 2015. vi + 451 pages. Paperback: 
ISBN 978-1-5176-9030-4.
RomaRic Jannel
The story of William Shakespeare’s Much Ado About Nothing takes place 
in Messina, an Italian city located in Sicily. At the end of the sixteenth cen-
tury, when he decided to write his comedy, Europe was considered by Euro-
peans to be the center of the civilized world. Even though the title of James 
Heisig’s Much Ado About Nothingness: Essays on Nishida and Tanabe is 
not so different from that of William Shakespeare’s comedy, his essays take 
place in a very different world. From Shakespeare’s century to Heisig’s, 
even the meaning of the word “world” itself has changed for almost every-
body; a shift that can be explained, among other reasons, by globalization.
Nevertheless, many specialists in the field of the history of ideas—and 
even more so in the field of the history of philosophy—were not ready 
to give up on their Eurocentrism. On the contrary, under the influence of 
thinkers such as Hegel, Husserl, and Heidegger, philosophy appeared as a 
purely occidental discipline, which was born in Greece and developed in 
Europe. It cannot be denied that, from a historical point of view, philoso-
phy is a Western invention. But the interest of European philosophers like 
Schopenhauer, Schelling, and Nietzsche in oriental ways of thinking is also 
generally accepted. Regarding East Asia, Europeans were at first interested 
in Indian and Chinese ways of thinking. During the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries, Japanese philosophers learned the occidental philosophies, 
some in Japan, and some in occidental countries. And they started to study 
what Anglophones call “continental philosophy” (another way to look at the 
history of philosophy from a European point of view).
In the twentieth century, a school of philosophy was born in Japan: the 
Kyoto school. According to many works related to philosophy in Japan, 
the foundations of the Kyoto school were mostly laid by the writings of 
T H E  E A S T E R N  B U D D H I S T  4 7 ,  2122
three authors: Nishida Kitarō (1870–1945), Tanabe Hajime (1885–1962), 
and Nishitani Keiji (1900–1990). The most influential specialist of the 
Kyoto school in the English-speaking world is probably James Heisig. He 
is a Permanent Fellow at the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture and 
Emeritus Professor at the Faculty of Arts and Letters of Nanzan University 
(Nagoya). He has dedicated the major part of his career to the study of the 
philosophies of Nishida, Tanabe, and Nishitani. Among other contributions, 
he is the author of Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto 
School (University of Hawai‘i Press, 2001), translated into many languages, 
and the co-editor (with Thomas P. Kasulis and John C. Maraldo) of Japa-
nese Philosophy: A Sourcebook (University of Hawai‘i Press, 2011).
The book under review focuses on the study of the philosophies of 
Nishida and Tanabe, as well as on the link that existed between them. It 
gathers together fourteen of Heisig’s essays (eight on Nishida and six on 
Tanabe), most of which have been published in journals, but some of which 
were initially written as lectures or presentations. However, the book does 
not feature a diversity of topics: as Heisig says, “Repeated explanations of 
a small number of key ideas—Nishida’s logic of basho and Tanabe’s logic 
of the specific chief among them—should offer some degree of continuity” 
(p. 1). Among other things, each key concept has been analyzed from dif-
ferent angles in respect to its place in the history of philosophical ideas. The 
key concept of this work is “nothingness” (mu 無), which explains why this 
character is printed on the front cover of the book.
In addition to some considerations concerning Nishida, the first essay of 
Heisig’s book presents many interesting ideas that give us a taste of what 
he considers Japanese philosophy to be.1 It also presents the ideas that were 
at the “heart” of Japanese philosophy in the twentieth century. The first part 
of the title of this book, Much Ado About Nothingness, is also the first part 
of the title of the first essay: “Much Ado About Nothingness: Getting to the 
Heart of Japanese Philosophy.” Contrary to the Occident, what we used to 
call the “Kyoto school” was not a philosophical trend focused on the con-
cept of “being,” but rather on “nothingness” as the basis of all things. Many 
concepts used by the philosophers of the Kyoto school are linked to the idea 
of nothingness, and this can mainly be explained by the differences between 
Eastern and Western ways of thinking. But Heisig’s views regarding the his-
tory of philosophical ideas around the world are not so basic. He explains: 
1 For us, the expression “Japanese philosophy” does not refer to something Japanese in 
essence but to a philosophical work written in the Japanese context. 
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I cannot believe that all philosophies around the world are basi-
cally the same, and certainly not that they are all equal. . . . What 
is far more interesting is the fact—at least in my experience, it 
is a fact—that all the great philosophies of the world contain the 
same things, only in different proportions and different configura-
tions. It is rather like a kaleidoscope. (p. 8)
This is for us an essential assertion. The oriental ways of thinking, and 
obviously Japanese philosophies, are frequently presented as original and 
fundamentally different from the occidental ones. For example, many phi-
losophers and intellectuals assert that the occidental classical philosophies 
were materialistic whereas the Indian ways of thinking were vacuist. But 
such representations only seem to be true if they are considered as gen-
eral tendencies. In fact, the materialistic school was also active in classi-
cal India, like Lokāyata’s doctrines in the sixth century.2 The differences 
between materialism and vacuism are basically a matter of the proportions 
and configurations of ideas: any debate that involves one of these concepts 
requires the existence of the second one. It is meaningless to discuss the 
definition of good without considering evil. Thus, we can assume that the 
roots of these fundamental ideas are probably universal, but in the end tend 
to evolve differently worldwide. Heisig carries on, explaining:
I don’t know a single idea in all of Japanese philosophy for which 
I cannot find a rough equivalent in Western philosophy for which 
I cannot find a rough equivalent in Western intellectual history 
(even if not always in philosophical form), but the placement of 
an idea, its role, its relation to other ideas gives it a uniqueness 
that can be familiar and foreign at the same time. And vice versa 
for Japanese counterparts to ideas of Western philosophy. (p. 8)
Heisig seems to consider that ideas form a web which can take different 
patterns; and these patterns can be unique and can express the profound 
meaning of each concept of this web. 
This book contains many similar, and quite interesting, considerations 
about philosophy and the history of philosophy. A specialist in Japanese phi-
losophy cannot investigate such matters; rather it falls within the competency 
2 The Lokāyata school is also known as the Cārvāka school. In France, among his other 
works, Paul Masson-Oursel, a specialist in comparative philosophy, introduced this school in 
1923 in his Esquisse d’une histoire de la philosophie indienne (edited by Paul Geuthner, pp. 
47–48).
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of a thinker who aims at building a link between Japanese philosophy and 
Western philosophies. Through this kind of comparative philosophy, the 
author presents studies by Nishida and Tanabe of some Western philoso-
phers such as Hegel and Kant. In other examples, he discusses the influence 
of Eckhart, Cusanus, and Boehme on the way that Nishida considers noth-
ingness as the ground of all things (pp. 46–52). As Heisig says: 
Nishida’s strategy for constructing an unus mundus is a mixture 
of Eckhart and Cusanus. Like Eckhart, he sees God and the world 
as sharing a common “groundless ground” beyond being and 
becoming. And like Cusanus, he sees that contact with the infi-
nite rubs off on the finite and transforms it into an infinitely open 
finiteness, a sphere without a circumference. (p. 68)
Of course, Heisig discusses what he seems to consider Nishida’s most 
important concept—what he poetically calls the “crown jewel” (p. 193) of 
Nishida’s philosophy—his “logic of basho” (basho no ronri 場所の論理). 
Nishida’s basho has something to do with Plato’s chora as an empty recep-
tacle or a no man’s land.3 But for Nishida, basho was much more “a frame-
work of enveloping universals” (p. 194). According to his students, Nishida 
“drew the basho on the blackboard as a series of concentric circles, the final 
of which was drawn as a dotted line to indicate an indefinite or infinite cir-
cumference” (p. 203). But such a definition seems to be highly theoretical 
and perhaps unsuitable to embrace human experience. As Heisig explains, 
Nishida’s “concern” was more likely to locate “the most fundamental of 
experiences, analyzing their structure, and noting the internal contradictions 
that necessitated an ever-more-encompassing perspective” (pp. 210–11). 
Tanabe’s most famous idea discussed in this book is probably his “logic 
of species” (shu no ronri 種の論理). Heisig analyzes this concept from 
different angles. At first, he proposes his own translation for this term 
as “logic of the specific,” arguing that “the latter made immediate sense 
in English and was free of the ambiguity and clumsiness of the former” 
(p. 261). He also writes: “More than that, it seemed to communicate bet-
ter the proposition I set out to argue, namely that Tanabe’s insight into the 
specific nature of all logical universals was timely for an age of runaway 
3 According to Heisig, “Plato imagined [chora] to hold the eternal and unchanging Ideas 
after which everything that comes into being is patterned.” He adds: “Insofar as the chora 
is not itself a being, but a place for all of being, it would seem to fit in well with Nishida’s 
project” (p. 156).
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globalized thinking like our own” (p. 261). Those statements can be found 
in the introduction of the essay “Tanabe’s Logic of the Specific and the Cri-
tique of the Global Village.” To sum it up, according to Heisig, Tanabe criti-
cizes through his “logic of the specific” what we now call “globalization” 
and what we see as its consequences. In his essay, Heisig offers a synthetic 
analysis of Tanabe’s “logic of the specific.” At first, he describes this logic 
as a “shift from the formal, syllogistic function of the specific to an onto-
logical description of absolute mediation” (p. 268). Then, he adds that “the 
specificity is defined primarily as the socio-cultural substratum of historical 
people” (p. 271) and that “socio-cultural specificity is defined as a nonra-
tionality that lies at the base of every human attempt to ground social exis-
tence rationally” (p. 275). Finally, he declares that “the ultimate foundation 
of specificity is not the being of historical relativity, but absolute nothing-
ness” (p. 278). Nothingness is decidedly presented as the main thought of 
this book and represents a key to understand and interpret the philosophies 
of Tanabe as well as Nishida. 
In conclusion, we should mention that this book also deals with other ideas 
and concepts such as “pure experience,” “self,” “no-self,” “god,” as well 
as many other authors such as Aristotle, Whitehead, Bergson, Kierkegaard, 
Marx, and Nishitani Keiji. Reflections upon the philosophy of religions—
notably Christianity and Buddhism—are also present in this work. It rep-
resents a very interesting introduction to the philosophy of Nishida and 
Tanabe. Our only regret, if we should mention one, is that the philosophical 
terminology is rarely given in Japanese. 
Right Thoughts at the Last Moment: Buddhism and Deathbed Practices in 
Early Medieval Japan. By Jacqueline L. Stone. Kuroda Institute Studies 
in East Asian Buddhism 26. Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2017. 
xviii + 597 pages. Hardcover: ISBN 978-0-8248-5643-4.
RobeRt F. Rhodes
Jacqueline Stone, the author of Original Enlightenment and the Transforma-
tion of Medieval Japanese Buddhism (University of Hawai‘i Press, 1999), 
the groundbreaking study of Japanese Buddhist original enlightenment 
(hongaku) thought, has written another splendid book, this time on medieval 
Japanese Buddhist deathbed rites. Each page of this hefty six-hundred-page 
T H E  E A S T E R N  B U D D H I S T  4 7 ,  2126
study brims with fascinating anecdotes, intriguing details, and provocative 
insights. A wide-ranging book, it discusses in meticulous detail virtually all 
aspects of deathbed rites in medieval Japan. Since it is impossible to discuss 
all the interesting points made in this rich and engrossing book, I will sim-
ply point out some of the major themes addressed in it.
In the opening page of her study, Stone succinctly states the theme of her 
book as follows: “This volume investigates the emergence and development 
in Japan of the discourses and practices surrounding the ideal of exemplary 
death, focusing on the late tenth- through early fourteenth-centuries” (p. 1). 
Japanese Buddhists of this period “held that one’s last thought shapes the 
circumstances of one’s next rebirth” and “developed ritual procedures for 
encouraging right mindfulness” in those who were dying in the hope that 
they would be “born in the superior realm of a buddha or bodhisattva, where 
one’s eventual awakening would be assured” (p. 1). Although this discourse 
of dying in the right state of mind in order to gain birth in a superior realm 
came to be most closely associated with Pure Land Buddhism, Stone makes 
the important point that Maitreya’s Tuṣita Heaven, Kannon’s Potalaka 
(Fudaraku in Japanese), and the Eagle Peak, depicted as Śākyamuni Bud-
dha’s Pure Land in the Lotus Sutra, were also popular postmortem destina-
tions for a significant number of people. But whatever realm they aspired 
to, it was axiomatic that a rightly focused mind at the moment of death was 
considered indispensable to getting there. Hence, the ideal of dying in an 
exemplary manner cut across sectarian boundaries and was embraced by 
monks and nuns as well as lay men and women. 
In chapter 1, “The Beginnings of Deathbed Practices in Japan,” Stone 
points out that, between 984 and 986, three pivotal events occurred which 
set the stage for the emergence of the Japanese deathbed rites: the composi-
tion of the Nihon ōjō gokuraku ki by the scholar Yoshishige no Yasutane (d. 
1002), the completion of the Ōjōyōshū by the Tendai monk Genshin (942–
1017), and the formation of the Twenty-Five Samādhi Society. The Nihon 
ōjō gokuraku ki was the first Japanese ōjōden—collections of biographies 
of people who met their end in an exemplary manner and demonstrated, 
through the signs accompanying their deaths, that they successfully gained 
entry into Amida’s Pure Land. The model of the ideal death that it promoted 
proved extremely influential. The Ōjōyōshū is a comprehensive outline of 
Pure Land practice and it exerted a pervasive influence on all subsequent 
deathbed manuals as well as the discourse on death in general. The Twenty-
Five Samādhi Society was an association of Tendai monks, including Gen-
shin, who pledged to help each other when one of the members fell mortally 
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ill, nursing the dying member and encouraging him to recite the nenbutsu 
correctly at the moment of death. Taken together, they marked the begin-
ning of medieval deathbed discourse and practice.
In the same chapter, Stone makes several astute comments that make us 
reconsider some long-held preconceptions about the history of Japanese 
Pure Land Buddhism. First, she points out that Pure Land Buddhism was not 
an independent movement or school in the pre-Kamakura period. Practices 
for gaining birth in the Pure Land of Amida Buddha were essential elements 
of the religious life in the Hossō, Tendai, and Shingon schools. Moreover, 
she argues that there is a need to qualify the view that there was a direct link 
between mappō consciousness and the rise of Pure Land Buddhism. Refer-
ences to mappō in Genshin’s works, for example, are not that numerous, 
appearing only in its famous preface. The mappō discourse only becomes 
all-pervasive in the exclusive nenbutsu movement of Hōnen and Shinran in 
the early Kamakura period. In addition, recent scholarship has emphasized 
that various Buddhist groups and institutions frequently invoked mappō to 
support their own goals and agendas. Finally, Stone states that “Pure Land 
aspirations were not born out of a failure of confidence in a moribund Bud-
dhist establishment” (p. 37) as many scholars have maintained. In fact, it 
arose at a time of impressive religious creativity and institutional innovation 
within Buddhism. In other words, “The rise of Pure Land aspirations and the 
deathbed rite for achieving them appeared in a time, not of Buddhist institu-
tional decline, but of growth and innovation” (p. 37). In addition, she shows 
that, for a long time, the nenbutsu was just one of several incantations used 
to transport the dying to the Pure Land; esoteric mantras, such as the Super-
lative Dhāraṇī of the Buddha’s Crown and the Mantra of Light, to give just 
two examples, were employed for this purpose as well.
The next several chapters take up various aspects of medieval deathbed 
rites in topical fashion. The second chapter, “A Realm Apart,” focuses 
on several issues concerning the postmortem world into which the dying 
sought to gain rebirth. Stone begins this chapter by making the following 
significant observation. According to received wisdom, an attitude of world 
rejection, encapsulated in the phrase “shunning this defiled world and aspir-
ing to the Pure Land” (onri edo gongu jōdo) made famous by the Ōjōyōshū, 
is considered to be the defining characteristic of Pure Land Buddhism. 
However, recent scholarship has begun to question this view, arguing that 
such a world-denying ethos represents only the most ascetic strand within 
the Pure Land tradition; in fact, many Pure Land texts are devoid of any 
world-denying admonitions. Moreover, as the historian Taira Masayuki has 
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argued, during the Heian period, religion was understood by most people 
as a means to gain both “blessings and protection in this world and some 
assurance for their fate in the next” (nise anraku shinkō); consequently, 
“‘Peace and security in this life and birth in a good place in the next’ . . . 
were considered by no means antithetical but as lying on the same con-
tinuum” (p. 82). Yet, while admitting that the importance of “shunning the 
world” has been overstated in earlier scholarship, Stone also notes that, in 
view of the pervasiveness of this discourse in medieval texts, it was a sig-
nificant element in the religious life of the people of this age.
The rest of the chapter deals with a number of interesting issues concern-
ing the understanding of the Pure Land and birth in it. First, since the Pure 
Land was considered to be a distant realm, several different strategies were 
employed to bring them “closer to home.” On the one hand, these transcen-
dent realms were identified with specific sacred sites. Tennōji in Naniwa 
(Osaka), for example, was reputed to be the “east gate” of Amida’s Pure 
Land, while Mt. Kōya became associated with the Pure Lands of both Amida 
and Maitreya. In both cases, this identification proved valuable in making 
these temples major pilgrimage sites. On the other hand, Tendai and Shin-
gon works developed a rhetoric denying the duality of this world and the 
Pure Land, asserting that the Pure Land is immanent in this world. Another 
issue discussed in this chapter concerns the status of those born in the Pure 
Land. Although the sutras maintain the absolute equality of everyone in the 
Pure Land, asserting that each person there has golden skin and is identically 
adorned with the thirty-two marks, Stone shows that Heian period docu-
ments frequently assume that familial and social relationships, such as those 
between husband and wife, parents and children, and master and disciple, 
will be carried over into the Pure Land. “This perspective,” Stone writes, 
“radically relativizes the rupture of death; its sorrow is not final” (p. 101). 
Another discrepancy between Buddhist doctrine and Buddhism practiced 
“on the ground” is found in the treatment of women’s birth in the Pure 
Land. Although Pure Land sutras assert that women cannot be born in the 
Pure Land qua women, both Heian men and women generally assumed that 
women will be born there as women. In this connection, James Dobbins’s 
comment, cited by Stone (p. 109), concerning the scene in the Tale of Genji 
where Genji expresses his hope to share the same lotus blossom in the Pure 
Land with the dying Murasaki, is quite apt: “It was a female Murasaki 
whom Genji had known in his life, and certainly it was a female Murasaki 
whom he longed to join in the Pure Land.” The chapter ends with a thought-
ful discussion of akunin ōjō, or “the birth of evil people in the Pure Land,” 
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in which Stone argues convincingly that such narratives served to empha-
size that the Pure Land is a realm apart, whose values are incommensurate 
with those of this world.
The third chapter, “Exemplary Death,” describes in great detail the image 
of an exemplary death found in Heian-period ōjōden and other texts. It first 
recounts how people prepared for their death, frequently by receiving the 
precepts and by moving to a special setting called “hall of impermanence” 
(mujōin) where they could be cared for, physically and spiritually, away 
from worldly distractions that could thwart them from dying in an exem-
plary style. In this connection, Stone makes the intriguing suggestion that, 
although the wish to shield the dying from objects of possible attachment is 
frequently cited in Pure Land texts as the reason for moving him or her to 
the hall of impermanence, fear of death pollution may have been a signifi-
cant factor as well. Contact with death was considered to be a major source 
of pollution, necessitating a lengthy period of purification, typically lasting 
thirty days, during which one is prevented from taking part in kami-related 
activities or entering the Imperial Palace and government offices. Hence, 
there was good reason for removing the dying to a special room or building 
to ensure their death would not cause ritual pollution to the living. 
The latter part of the chapter highlights the various rituals carried out 
for the dying. Here Stone provides a wealth of detail concerning the Bud-
dhist images that were used in deathbed rites, the ideal bodily posture to be 
assumed at the moment of death, as well as the practice of holding, while 
on the deathbed, a five-colored cord attached to the Buddhist image in the 
hope that the dying would be pulled along to the Pure Land by the Buddha. 
The chapter concludes by noting that a number of deathbed practices were 
recommended for the dying in accord with the latter’s spiritual inclinations. 
Since most people aspired for birth in Amida’s Pure Land in the next life, 
the nenbutsu, sometimes taking the form of an unceasing nenbutsu ( fudan 
nenbutsu) rite, was by far the most common deathbed practice. However, 
as Stone notes, this does not exhaust the range of sacred texts and deities 
invoked on the deathbed. Some conducted practices centered on the Lotus 
Sutra, such as the Lotus Repentance Rite (Hokke senbō), while others 
recited the name of Maitreya, various dhāraṇīs, and sutra passages (like 
those from the Flower Ornament Sutra) as well. As this shows, the nen-
butsu recitation did not have a monopoly on deathbed invocations.
The following chapter, “Interpreting the Signs,” focuses on the vari-
ous auspicious deathbed signs that were believed to signal a successful 
Pure Land birth. Birth in the Pure Land required dying in a state of right 
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mindfulness, but whether or not the deceased did achieve such a properly 
focused mental state is obviously unknowable to others. Hence, extraordi-
nary signs observed by the living, such as the appearance of purple clouds, 
sweet fragrance, and music at the moment of death, and most notably, aus-
picious dreams about the deceased, became the criteria for judging whether 
Pure Land birth was actually achieved. As Stone astutely points out, “Ōjō 
has a profoundly social dimension” since “ōjō as a social fact was deter-
mined by consensus of the living” (p. 182).
Starting from such an observation, this chapter first examines auspi-
cious dreams and the range of people privileged to see them. (Frequently 
they were fellow practitioners, relatives, or friends, but there are also cases 
when the dreamer has no preexisting ties with the deceased.) Another point 
highlighted here is that such auspicious dreams serve to verify a master’s 
spiritual achievements to his disciples and to legitimize the use of certain 
practices as a means to gain Pure Land birth within a particular religious 
organization. The interesting phenomena of people who visit practitioners 
believed to be destined to achieve Pure Land birth in order to create kar-
mic ties with them, as well as tales of practitioners who publicize the hour 
of their death in advance in order to perform “ascetic suicides,” are also 
recounted in this chapter. 
Chapter 5, entitled “Anxieties,” is perhaps the most absorbing chapter in 
this volume. This chapter investigates what Stone aptly calls the “‘dark side’ 
of the ideal of exemplary death” (p. 221). Paradoxically, with the spread of 
the notion that one can attain birth in the Pure Land by maintaining a proper 
state of mind at the moment of death, many people began to harbor anxi-
eties that they might be unable to achieve this ideal on the deathbed and, 
consequently, that they would fall into evil realms of existence in the next 
lifetime. Such anxiety appeared among the elites in the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries and spread to society at large in the thirteenth century. This 
chapter examines the various obstacles to achieving an exemplary death 
described in texts related to deathbed rites, such as distractions (including 
those induced by idle chatter among the attending nurses), attachments, 
and demonic interference arising at the moment of death. Another topic 
treated in this chapter concerns the various strategies employed to ensure 
one would die in an exemplary manner. In this context, Stone suggests that 
the urge to amass as much merit as possible by, for example, reciting the 
nenbutsu, dhāraṇīs, and sutras hundreds or thousands of times, reflects 
the widespread anxiety that one’s own death might fall short of the ideal 
required for an auspicious afterlife.
B O O K  R E V I E W S 131
The sixth chapter, “Deathbed Attendants,” breaks new ground with an 
original analysis of the zenchishiki, or the deathbed attendants. Originally, 
zenchishiki simply meant “good spiritual friends” who help and encourage 
others in following the Buddhist path. However, in order to cope with the 
uncertainty surrounding the final moment, a new class of ritual special-
ists charged with caring for the dying and ensuring they would achieve an 
auspicious end, came into existence. Zenchishiki was the name given to 
these ritual specialists. To help them in carrying out their duties, a num-
ber of deathbed manuals were composed. (Brief summaries of eighteen of 
these deathbed manuals are included in the appendix to this volume [pp. 
383–92].) Relying primarily on these texts, Stone outlines in rich detail 
the duties of these attendants, including the preparation of the “halls of 
impermanence,” nursing the dying, encouraging the dying spiritually by 
exhorting them to maintain a state of right mental concentration, dispelling 
inauspicious visions and demonic interference, as well as performing post-
mortem rituals once their charge had died.
The final chapter, “The Longue Durée of Deathbed Rites,” deals with the 
development of deathbed rites from the Kamakura period until they ceased 
to exist in the late nineteenth century. During the Kamakura period, the 
warriors became prominent protagonists in the discourse concerning ōjō 
and a new discourse concerning the proper way to die was created in both 
the Pure Land schools of Hōnen and his followers, as well as in the Zen 
schools. All of these developments, as well as late medieval and early mod-
ern elaborations, are given extensive treatment in this chapter.
The brief overview given above cannot do justice to the extraordinary 
richness of this book. Not only has Stone gathered together an impressive 
amount of information concerning medieval Japanese deathbed rituals, 
she has also offered a number of innovative insights for rethinking several 
major issues in the study of Japanese Buddhism. Moreover, since it is well 
organized, written in a clear style, and uses numerous unforgettable anec-
dotes as supporting evidence, this book is a pleasure to read. Right Thoughts 
at the Last Moment will surely become the standard work on medieval 
Japanese deathbed practices and required reading for anyone interested in 
Japanese religion and culture.
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An Early Text on the History of Rwa sgreng Monastery: The rGyal ba’i 
dben gnas rwa sgreng gi bshad pa nyi ma’i ’od zer of ’Brom shes rab me 
lce. By Maho Iuchi. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017. 210 
pages. Hardcover: ISBN: 978-0-6749-7556-9.
alexandeR K. smith 
Maho Iuchi’s An Early Text on the History of Rwa sgreng Monastery offers 
a highly specialized contribution to the study of the bKa’ gdams school of 
Tibetan Buddhism. Iuchi’s remarks focus on a late thirteenth-century text 
entitled rGya ba’i dben gnas rwa sgreng gi bshad pa nyi ma’i ’od zer (Rays 
of the Sun: A Statement Concerning Rwa sgreng Monastery, the Hermitage 
of the Victor), which was recently compiled by the dPal brtsegs Institute 
and republished by the mTsho sngon mi rigs Publishing House in 2010. The 
manuscript is primarily concerned with the establishment and patronage 
of Rwa sgreng Monastery, ranging from its foundation by ’Brom ston pa 
rGyal ba’i ’byung gnas (1004–1064) in 1057 to the year of the manuscript’s 
composition circa 1299. Despite the monastery’s later political importance 
under the government of the dGa’ ldan pho brang, very little is known about 
Rwa sgreng’s existence during the height of the bKa’ gdams period (from 
the eleventh to the thirteenth century). As a consequence, Iuchi’s work pro-
vides researchers with a unique window onto the historical complexities of 
Rwa sgreng’s early development. 
The book itself is divided into two sections. In part one, Iuchi provides 
a historical overview of Rwa sgreng, drawing heavily from translations 
which, for unstated reasons, the author has chosen to exclude from her 
book. Additionally, Iuchi offers a brief codicological discussion of the 
manuscript’s most salient features, as well as extensive tables outlining the 
contents of the monastery’s reliquary and lineage of abbatial succession. 
What is remarkable about Iuchi’s commentary, however, are the details that 
emerge regarding the early patronage of Rwa sgreng. The author focuses, in 
particular, on the prominent roles played by both the Ber family (ber rgyud ) 
and the kingdom of Mi nyag in financing the construction and expansion 
of Rwa sgreng during the bKa’ gdams period. This places Iuchi’s work in 
a larger historical context, making it of potential value to social historians 
and researchers focusing on the subject of monastic patronage during the 
so-called later spread of Buddhism in Tibet (bstan pa phyi dar).
In part two, the author provides two reproductions of the rGya ba’i dben 
gnas rwa sgreng gi bshad pa nyi ma’i ’od zer: (1) a photographic facsimile 
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of the original dbu-med manuscript, which appears in the book’s appendix; 
and (2) an annotated version of the manuscript transcribed into dbu-chen 
script (pp. 59–142). The Tibetan manuscript itself is divided into two chap-
ters. As Iuchi writes: “Chapter one is a description of the construction of 
Rwa sgreng monastery that consists of three sections: (1-1) prophecies; (1-2) 
[the] history of Atiśa and ‘Brom ston pa; and (1-3) [the] construction of … 
Rwa sgreng monastery” (p. 17). The second chapter, which is significantly 
shorter, provides a discussion of the rten, or “sacred objects,” that were 
housed at the monastery at the end of the thirteenth century. It is important 
to note that the author’s dbu-chen facsimile is followed by a detailed index 
of the persons, places, texts, and regional terminology that appear in the 
manuscript. As these are coupled with folio and line references, Iuchi’s 
annotated version is particularly accessible to specialists interested in 
expanding upon her work. 
In conclusion, Maho Iuchi’s An Early Text on the History of Rwa sgreng 
Monastery offers a brief but compelling look into the development of Rwa 
sgreng Monastery during the bKa’ gdams period. While the publication 
suffers slightly from periodic errors in the author’s Wylie transliterations, 
I would highly recommend the book to specialists interested in compiling 
social historical data on monastic patronage or, more specifically, on the 
history of the bKa’ gdams school.
Entwicklungen des Buddhismus im Zwanzigsten Jahrhundert in Indonesien: 
Strömungen, Verwerfungen und Aushandlungen der „Agama Buddha (di) 
Indonesia.“ By Julia Linder. Religionswissenschaft 21. Frankfurt am Main: 
Peterlang, 2017. 322 pages. Paperback: ISBN 978-3-6317-2642-6.
michael Pye 
In this substantial work by Julia Linder we find a historical presentation of 
the vicissitudes of Buddhism in Indonesia in the twentieth century, com-
bined with a presentation of the diverse threads of tradition and consider-
able detail about leading personalities who have been involved in steering 
Buddhist followers through successive political situations. It is based on 
historical research and well-planned investigations in the field. Since it 
derives from postgraduate work, there is a substantial account of the (com-
mendable) methodology employed. Should there ever be a chance of an 
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English edition, this part could conceivably be taken for granted, and 
reduced, and the pages taken up instead by an index. The latter would be 
valuable because numerous elements in the overall story recur, for perfectly 
good reasons, at different points in the overall presentation. Indeed, apart 
from its other merits, the work in effect functions as a basic reference guide 
to Indonesian Buddhism. The multilingual documentation is also very wel-
come and includes substantial quotations in Bahasa Indonesia. 
The dominance of Islam in Indonesia may create for some people the 
impression that other religions are of little importance or hardly exist at 
all. Indeed, the political and legal circumstances in the country mean that 
the administrative status and social arrangements of religion (agama) are 
fragile. These public circumstances have also been subject to change from 
time to time. In the case of Buddhism (known in Indonesian as “Agama 
Buddha”), there is the added complexity that there are various strands in the 
tradition which have often, but not always, fitted together. There are both 
Theravada and Mahayana components. The latter have been carried for-
ward, not exclusively, but to a significant degree, within the Chinese com-
munity of Indonesia, which has experienced persecution and other severe 
difficulties as an ethnic group. Moreover, among the various cross-currents 
there has been the political need, as for any religious group in the country 
which seeks legal recognition, to subscribe somehow to the more or less 
theistic principle of “one supreme Lordship” (Ketuhanan yang maha esa) 
required by government. 
Even though the phrase “Ketuhanan yang maha esa” does not specify 
a Muslim view of God (the name of Allah is notably not used), it does 
represent a challenge for non-Muslim religions. For non-theist Buddhism 
the phrase is not merely a conceptual challenge in itself, but one which 
is complicated by attempts to align it with the Chinese idea of the “three 
teachings” (sanjiao). The other two, Confucianism and Daoism, also do not 
self-evidently propose recognition of a supreme Lord above all things, and 
certainly not along the lines which are typical of Islam. But there have been 
various waves of Buddhist mission in Indonesia, including both Mahayana 
and Theravada elements. Linder explains how these were somehow pulled 
together under the label of “Agama Buddha di Indonesia,” and how this 
agama came to be presented as revering one “Lord,” namely Ādi-Buddha, 
the underlying principle of Buddhahood in focused form. This subtle, con-
ceptually acrobatic process was enabled in part by adducing the Old Java-
nese Buddhist text Sang Hyang Kamahāyānikan and was worked out by 
Dhammaviriya in various writings in the 1960s (see p. 129). He was able to 
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identify “Ketuhanan yang maha esa” with Sanghyang Ādi-Buddha, and this 
Buddha-name thereupon came to be displayed in temples as a sign that the 
Buddhist religion was consistent with the five unifying principles ( pancasila) 
of the secular state. It was easy enough to identify a group of “scriptures” 
to include together the Theravada canon, leading sutras in Sanskrit, and the 
abovementioned Old Javanese classic. Gautama and the bodhisattvas were 
pressed into service as “prophets” (nabi, from the Arabic). It may be added 
that Confucius, without any reference to Buddhism, is also occasionally so 
designated in Chinese temples (kelenteng). 
The above is just one particularly well known and arresting moment in 
the whole complex story of Indonesian Buddhism, here most excellently 
related, which is marked both by a succession of personalities such as the 
revered Ashin Jinarakkhita (detailed portrait on pp. 97 ff.) and by many 
organizational groupings and regroupings. The latter led to an impressive 
array of acronyms such as PERBUDI, standing for “Perhimpunan Bud-
dhis Indonesia” (Community of Buddhists in Indonesia; see p. 108), or 
MAGABUDHI, standing for “Majelis Agama Buddha Theravāda Indone-
sia” (Indonesian Association of Theravada Buddhism). Fortunately Linder 
provides a checklist of more than fifty of these acronyms. In spite of practi-
cal attempts at cooperation between the various institutions, an exclusive 
Theravada sangha was founded in 1976. It is notable that this group put 
forward an alternative to Ādi-Buddha as the unifying principle of “Lordship” 
(ketuhanan), namely, nothing less than nirvana, focused religiously through 
the three jewels (sang triratna).
While Linder weaves her way confidently through all the modern politi-
cal and religious developments, she is fully cognizant of the wide range of 
religious reference points within the overall field of Indonesian Buddhism: 
its location in Chinese temples, its connection with Javanese mystical tradi-
tions, later Theosophical strands, Sai Baba-ism, and last but not least the 
Borobudur heritage of the “Buddha time” ( jaman buda), which still towers 
almost irreducibly in the background.
